

D 767  
.A54  
1944

## FOR REFERENCE

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM  
CAT. NO. 1935

LIBRARY BURE

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA, HDQ,  
"RENO" V WORKING DRAFT... 8 May 1944  
1944-45

LIBRARY  
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

D  
767  
.A54  
1944

<b>Report Documentation Page</b>			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188		
<p>Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.</p>					
1. REPORT DATE <b>MAY 1944</b>	2. REPORT TYPE <b>N/A</b>	3. DATES COVERED <b>-</b>			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE <b>RENO V Working Draft of Outline Plan for Operations of the southwest Pacific Area 1944-1945</b>			5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
			5b. GRANT NUMBER		
			5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S)			5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
			5e. TASK NUMBER		
			5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) <b>Southwest Pacific Area, HDQ.</b>			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
			11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT <b>Approved for public release, distribution unlimited</b>					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES <b>JFSC - WW II Declassified Records.</b>					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: a. REPORT      b. ABSTRACT      c. THIS PAGE			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT <b>SAR</b>	18. NUMBER OF PAGES <b>37</b>	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
<b>unclassified</b>	<b>unclassified</b>	<b>unclassified</b>			

DOWNGRADED TO:

8 MAY 1944  
RCA  
JRC

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA**

**"RENO" V**

**WORKING DRAFT  
OF  
OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
OPERATIONS OF THE  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA**

**1944-1945**

**8 MAY 1944**

**DRAFT NO. 6**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**COPY NO. 2**

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMO V  
OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
OPERATIONS OF THE  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
TO INCLUDE THE ASSAULT ON  
THE PHILIPPINES

5 MAY 1944

~~TOP SECRET~~

REMO V  
OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
OPERATIONS OF THE  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF  
THE PHILIPPINES

TABLE OF CONTENTS	PAGE
Paragraph 1 - <u>CONCEPT.</u>	(1-5)
a. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC, 1944.	1
b. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.	2
c. TASKS.	2
d. ANALYSIS OF TASKS.	2
e. SCHEME OF MANEUVER.	3
f. LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS.	5
Paragraph 2 - <u>OPERATIONS.</u>	(6-13)
PHASE I	6
PHASE II	8
PHASE III	10
PHASE IV	12

~~TOP SECRET~~

REFOV

ANNEXES

1. PHASES OF OPERATIONS.

2. SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

- a. PHASE I.
- b. PHASE II.
- c. PHASE III.
- d. PHASE IV.

3. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED.

(MAJOR UNITS, AMPHIBIOUS LIFT AND AIR GROUPS)

4. EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT ELEMENTS.

- a. EMPLOYMENT OF MAJOR UNITS.
  - b. LOCATION OF MAJOR UNITS.
  - c. DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS.
- 1. PHASE I.
  - 2. PHASE IIa.
  - 3. PHASE IIb.
  - 4. PHASE III.
  - 5. PHASE IVa.
  - 6. PHASE IVb.

5. LOCATION OF BASES.

- a. INITIAL MAIN SUPPLY BASES.
- b. BASES, PHASE I.
- c. BASES, PHASE II.
- d. BASES, PHASE III.
- e. BASES, PHASE IV.

6. ESTIMATE OF SERVICE ELEMENTS REQUIRED (to follow).

TOP SECRET

KENO V

COMINT PLAN

FOR

OPERATIONS OF THE

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF

THE PHILIPPINES

1. CONCEPT.

a. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC, 1944.

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have designated the FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA area as the strategic objective of operations in the PACIFIC during 1944 and early 1945 in order to support the Chinese war effort and establish bases for a final assault upon JAPAN. They have decided to establish forces in the FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA area by advances from present positions through the MARIANAS, CAROLINES, PALAU and MINDANAO as follows:

(a) Establishment of control of the MARIANAS-CAROLINES-PALAU area by forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas:

1. By neutralization of TRUK, and occupation of the Southern MARIANAS during June 1944.

Objective, to secure control of sea communications in the Central PACIFIC by isolating and neutralizing the CAROLINES, and by establishing sea and air bases for operations against Japanese sea routes and for long-range air attack against the Japanese Homeland.

2. By occupation of PALAU during September 1944.

Objectives, to extend our control to the eastern approaches to the PHILIPPINES and FORMOSA, and to establish a fleet and air base and forward staging area for the support of operations against MINDANAO, FORMOSA and CHINA.

(b) Occupation of MINDANAO by forces of the Southwest Pacific Area, supported by the PACIFIC Fleet, target date 15 November 1944.

Objective, to establish air forces to reduce and contain Japanese forces in the PHILIPPINES preparatory to a further advance to FORMOSA, either directly or via LUZON, and to conduct air strikes against enemy installations in the N.E.I.

(c) Occupation of FORMOSA, or occupation of LUZON should such operations prove necessary prior to the move on FORMOSA, target date 15 February 1945.

The Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, is assigned responsibility for planning LUZON operations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also indicated that certain very long-range elements of the 20th Air Force may be employed from Northwestern AUSTRALIA against targets in the N.E.I. in the event that necessary bases are unavailable in the Southern MARIANAS.

**b. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.**

Under the above concept of PACIFIC operations, the strategic objectives of the Southwest Pacific Area are:

- (1) To establish necessary land, naval and air bases in the Southern PHILIPPINES.
- (2) To re-establish U.S. sovereignty in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
- (3) To support operations into the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area by destroying or containing hostile forces in the PHILIPPINES, and providing such air, naval and logistic support as may prove necessary.
- (4) To reduce the hostile war-making power by air operations against installations in the N.E.I.

**c. TASKS.**

Present

The tasks assigned the Southwest Pacific Area by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are:

"Complete the isolation of RABAUL and KAVIENG with minimum commitment of forces."

"Assist in the neutralization of TRUK and PALAU."

"Following HOLLANDIA, with available forces, conduct operations along the NEW GUINEA coast and such other operations as may be feasible in preparation for support of the PALAU operation and the assault on MINDANAO."

Eventual

Eventual tasks to complete attainment of strategic objectives will presumably be:

Seize MINDANAO by waterborne and airborne operations, and establish land, naval and air bases for support of subsequent operations to seize the LUZON-FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

Re-occupy LUZON, establish bases as necessary and provide air and naval support for operations into the FORMOSA and CHINA coast areas.

Destroy hostile installations, sources of war materials and shipping in the BORNEO-N.E.I. area.

**d. ANALYSIS OF TASKS.**

This outline plan embodies operations along the NEW GUINEA axis preliminary to the occupation of PALAU and MINDANAO, the seizure of MINDANAO, and the reoccupation of the Northern PHILIPPINES, under the assumption that the latter operation proves a necessary preliminary to penetration of the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area. Support by the full resources of the PACIFIC Fleet throughout PHILIPPINE operations is assumed.

Initially, an advance is required northwestward from HOLLANDIA with forces made available by J.C.S. 713/5 to seize air bases necessary for

fully effective support of PALAU operations and general support of MINAMAO operations. Thereafter, seizure of additional bases is necessary to provide land-based direct air support and flank protection for the attack upon MINANAO.

While hostile garrisons along our line of advance are at present comparatively weak, and MINANAO is partly controlled by our own guerrillas who operate extensive intelligence and communications nets, the enemy is actively consolidating his positions throughout the area. Garrisons are being reinforced by major elements of the Japanese army as rapidly as shipping permits, air bases are being augmented and stocked and advance naval facilities increased. While our ability to isolate a given objective and bring overwhelming forces to bear upon it will continue, we may anticipate that as his consolidation progresses, seizure will require more elaborate and sustained support as well as greater assault forces. Our operations into MINANAO become a race against hostile defensive development, with the earliest practicable establishment of control over PALAU and HALMAHERA a factor of major importance.

Destruction of hostile air and light naval forces in LUZON and establishment of bases for support of FORMOSA-CHINA coast operations will require occupation of the Central Plains area of the Island, including MANILA. Subsequent establishment of air elements at the extreme north in the vicinity of APARRI will probably also prove necessary. The occupation of LUZON will bring about complete destruction of Japanese forces throughout the Islands and redeem our National pledge to the PHILIPPINE people.

Air action all along the line of contact is required to destroy hostile war materials at the source and in transit in the BORNEO-N.E.I. area.

Throughout these operations, the isolation of RAMAUL and KAVIENG must be maintained with minimum forces.

#### e. SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

##### (1) General.

The general scheme of maneuver is to advance our land-based bomber line westward along the land masses of Western NEW GUINEA and intervening islands to the PHILIPPINES by successive occupation of the minimum bases required. Steps are coordinated with operations in the MANDATES to provide, in each instance, necessary land-based air support for subsequent operations. Hostile strength is by-passed wherever practicable and our flanks protected essentially by air action,

In the PHILIPPINES, air forces and advance naval bases are established in order to extend the range of air and naval action and provide the support required for successful penetration by United Nations forces into the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

Destructive air attacks are employed to soften up and gain air superiority over hostile air bases endangering our next advance. Hostile naval forces and shipping are destroyed along the line of advance, preventing reinforcement or supply of enemy air and naval forces within range and of objectives under attack. Ground forces are displaced forward by water and air, covered by naval and/or air forces, to seize and establish bases in each successive objective. Air and naval forces are established and the process repeated to successive objectives. Intermediate hostile installations by-passed are neutralized or contained by air, land and sea action. Air attacks are delivered by the most effective combination of land-based

and other combat elements available at the time. When resources are available in sufficient force to provide unselected direct air support of landing operations, the number of objectives is decreased and the length of the front correspondingly extended.

(2) The operations divide as follows (see Annex 1).

**Phase I** An advance northward along the north coast of NEW GUINEA to seize and establish in the GEMELIK BAY area the bases required initially for support of operations to seize PALAU and subsequently for support and flank protection of operations to occupy MINDANAO.

**Phase II** Continuation of the advance northward to seize in the MINDANAO area the bases required for land-based direct air support and flank protection of operations to occupy MINDANAO. Air bases in the ARAFURA SEA area are occupied if required to implement these operations.

**Phase III** Occupation of MINDANAO and establishment of bases for the reoccupation of LUZON and for air operations in the Northern BORNEO area.

**Phase IV**  
(As directed by  
the Joint Chiefs  
of Staff)

Reoccupation of LUZON and establishment of bases necessary for support of attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

**Continuing  
Commitments**

Maintenance of the neutralization of RABAUL and KAVIENG with minimum forces, until occupation becomes more economical.

Air operations against hostile installations, sources of war materials and shipping in the BORNEO-N.E.I. area.

(3) Sequence and Timing.

The above sequence is based largely upon dispositions and capabilities and is subject to change dependent upon hostile reaction and the measure of success attained in operations in the MANDATES and along the NEW GUINEA-MINDANAO axis.

Timing is dependent upon availability of means and progress of hostile consolidation.

Flexibility is attained, to take advantage of enemy weakness, by elimination of objectives or phases.

The timing of operations given below is based upon decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and availability of means as outlined in J.C.S. 713/5 and WD radiogram 9171/12 March:

Phase I - May - July 1944  
Phase II - August - October 1944  
Phase III - November - December 1944  
Phase IV - January - June 1945

(4) Major Combat Elements Required.

Minimum estimates of requirements in major units, air groups and amphibious lift are shown in Annex 3.

~~TOP SECRET~~

f. LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS.

Logistic support for offensive operations is provided from intermediate and advance bases along the NEW GUINEA-MINDANAO axis, that for neutralization operations in the BOUGAINVILLE-NEW IRELAND area from bases along the SOLOMONS axis. Major amphibious operations are launched from mounting areas maintained on the north coast of NEW GUINEA and in the South Pacific Area.

Task forces establish supply points for support of local garrisons in newly-occupied areas. Initially, supplies are obtained from bases now established or under construction, while as operations progress, ports and supply bases are advanced by corresponding bounds.

Heavy ships are employed for concentration of troops and for movement to forward areas where port or lighterage facilities are adequate. Amphibious craft are used for the forward movement from concentration areas of assault elements with accompanying or immediately following equipment and supplies. Upon completion of the assault phase, heavy ships are utilized to advance the supporting elements, service troops, materials and supplies necessary to complete the consolidation and to establish ports and bases. Bulk petroleum products are transported forward to intermediate bases in small tankers to locations where the tactical situation permits installation of bulk storage.

Assault units are in general rehabilitated in place, and every effort is made to eliminate rearward movement of troops and equipment.

As intermediate and advance bases are developed in forward areas, trans-PACIFIC shipping is diverted directly thereto in increasing volume.

For proposed logistic establishments, see Annex 5.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. OPERATIONS.

PHASE I

a. TASK.

Advance northwestward along the north coast of NEW GUINEA to seize and establish in the GELVINK BAY area the bases required initially for support of operations to seize PALAU and subsequently for support and flank protection of operations to occupy MINDANAO.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Air bases are required in GELVINK BAY to defeat hostile attempts to establish an effective defense in Western NEW GUINEA and the MOLUKKAS, and to neutralize hostile air and naval forces in the HALMAHERA area during PALAU operations. These same bases are required during the MINDANAO operation for staging purposes, and by air forces charged with protection of the western flank. Suitable sites are under active development by the enemy on BIAK ISLAND and in the NOEMFOOR-MANGUARI-NOEMI triangle. Our entry into GELVINK BAY will require establishment of an intermediate fighter base for direct air support and convoy cover.

Operations to occupy the necessary bases must be conducted by forces allocated to the Southwest Pacific Area by J.C.S. 713/5.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2a).

(1) WADE, May 1944.

A preliminary landing operation from HOLLANDIA establishes an advance fighter base in the WADE area to provide close air support and cover for subsequent operations to seize BIAK ISLAND. Direct air support and convoy cover for the WADE operation are provided from HOLLANDIA airdromes.

(2) BIAK ISLAND, June 1944.

As soon as adequate direct air support and convoy cover become available, an overseas landing operation from HOLLANDIA seizes hostile airdromes on BIAK ISLAND. Direct and general air support are provided from Northern NEW GUINEA airdromes, general support from the DARWIN area. Naval support is provided by the 7th Fleet.

The necessary air and light naval bases are established to maintain neutralization of hostile forces in the VOELKOP and MAGLUEER GULF areas and provide for long-range operations into HALMAHERA by attack bombardment. Advance staging areas and naval facilities are developed for support of subsequent operations into the Northern VOELKOP and HALMAHERA.

(3) BISMARCKS-BOUGAINVILLE.

In order to reduce air and naval elements committed to containing operations, mopping up on BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND is continued to a point where hostile forces are beyond capability of conducting or facilitating air and/or naval interference with our operations. Air and naval blockade of the RABAUL-NEW IRELAND area are continued.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
~~J.C.S. 713/5~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. ELEMENTS OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED (see Annex 3).

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Own Divisions</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
1-2/3 Divs	9-2/3 Divs	14-1/3 Divs
3 Divs (1 immediately available) 1 Regt Prebt		1 Regt Prebt

<sup>xx</sup>Including assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces.<sup>xx</sup>

Assigned elements 5th Air Force  
 " " 13th Air Force  
 " " RAAF Command  
 " " 7th Fleet  
 U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements assigned for operations against the RABAUL-KAVIENG area.

<sup>xx</sup>Shore-based, including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
7th Fleet	WANDE, 2/3 Div DIAK, 1-1/3 Divs

c. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5b.

a. TASK.

Seizure in the AMBOIN area, bases required for land-based direct air support and flank protection of operations to cover MINDANAO. Air bases in the AMBOIN SEA area are occupied by Japanese to support these operations.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Advance into MINDANAO from the BENGUET STRAIT BAY requires neutralization of the threat to our operations from hostile bases in HALMAHERA and MINDORO as well as establishment of intermediate staging fields to permit employment of airborne forces. Possession of such fields also permits augmentation of carrier-based direct air support by land-based fighters and the employment of land-based attack bombardment against hostile naval forces in the MOROTAI PASSAGE and Northern GUINEA SEA. Although occupied by the enemy, fields on Northern HALMAHERA and/or MOROTAI offer the most satisfactory fulfillment of these requirements. Other sites are handicapped by limited capacity and/or less suitable geographical locations.

Seizure of Northern HALMAHERA direct from bases at HOLLANDIA and GELVINK BAY requires an intermediate step to deploy the necessary land-based direct air support at suitable points in the Northern VOGLIOP or WAIGAO ISLAND. If occupied, the SIME STRAIT area brings with it oil fields with a potential yield of 10,000 barrels daily.

In event material hostile land-based air opposition develops in the Eastern N.E.I., it may prove necessary to establish air forces in the KAI and YAMBAR Groups to neutralize the AMBOIN area and support our advance westward of the VOGLIOP.

c. SCHEMES OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2b).

(1) Northern VOGLIOP, August 1944.

Airdromes and light naval bases are established on the northern coast of the VOGLIOP or on WAIGAO ISLAND, as reconnaissance and the hostile situation at the time indicates, by an overseas landing operation from HOLLANDIA with advance elements staged at BIKI ISLAND. Direct air support is provided from GELVINK BAY, general support from Northern NEW GUINEA and BAWIEN airdromes.

Air and naval elements are established for flank protection and direct support of operations to seize objectives in the MOROTAI-Northern HALMAHERA area.

(2) HALMAHERA, September 1944.

Airdromes and light naval bases in HALMAHERA and MOROTAI are seized or neutralized by an overseas landing operation from NEW GUINEA bases. The operation is coordinated with seizure of PALAU by Pacific Ocean Area Forces. Direct air support is provided by carrier-based elements or from the VOGLIOP, general support from Northwestern AUSTRALIA and Northern NEW GUINEA. Naval support is provided by the 7th Fleet.

Air and naval elements are established in the MOROTAI-Northern HALMAHERA area for flank protection, support and staging of airborne elements in subsequent operations to occupy MINDANAO.

TOP SECRET

(U) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ August 2010.

In event hostile strength in the Northern H.A.Z. requires closure of our border line into the area, air assets to amphibious operations northward of the boundary, amphibious forces are moved from Northern H.A.Z. areas, and the R.A.F. and R.A.A.F. Groups are called by amphibious operations employing Australian forces. Direct air support and cover cover are provided by land-based elements from RAAF and ARVN R.A.A.F. aircraft. Naval support is provided by the 7th Fleet.

All elements are promptly established for support of operations into the RABAUCA area.

Diversion of amphibious lift to this operation will either require provision of lift for Northern H.A.Z. and RABAUCA from extra-theater sources or involve a corresponding delay in these operations.

d. DISPOSITION OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED (see Annex 3).

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault</u> <sup>x</sup>	<u>One Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
VOCLEIDP-MALAKERA, 3 Divs	6 Divs	8-2/3 Divs	19-2/3 Divs
ARAPURA SEA, 2 Divs			

<sup>x</sup> Including assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces.<sup>x</sup>

Assigned elements 5th Air Force  
" " 13th Air Force  
" " RAAF Command  
" " 7th Fleet

U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements assigned for operations in the RABAUCA area.

<sup>x</sup> Shore-based, including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. PACIFIC Fleet, incident to PALAU operations.	7th Fleet,	Western VOCLEIDP, 1 Div MALAKERA, 1-1/2 Divs ARAPURA SEA, 1 Div

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5a.

TOP SECRET

PLANE 101

**b. MISSION.**

Occupy MINDANAO and establish bases for the reoccupation of SWHORN and for our operations in the Northern BORNEO area.

**c. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.**

Occupation of MINDANAO requires combined airborne and overseas landing operations on a major scale to seize the necessary beachheads and quickly secure the portions of the island vital to our purposes. Our major objective areas are the north-central plateau VALENCIA-CAGAYAN area as a base for attack aviation operations into LUZON, the DAVAO area as a naval and logistic base and the coastal area COTABATO-MALARANG for heavy bombardment bases and overland operations to occupy the road net of the Island. SURIGAO, SAMARINA, JOLLO and SARANGANI are required later to control entrances to the waters to the northwest.

The existing guerrilla organizations are capable of material assistance in our operations. Prompt and ample seaborne reinforcement and supply of initial assault are mandatory. Airborne operations to quickly seize our inland objectives and permit employment of air transport on a major scale to supplement seaborne movement, are essential to prompt isolation of principal hostile forces from each other and for speedy development of air bases for support of subsequent operations. These airborne operations become feasible upon establishment of adequate staging bases along the line from Western NEW GUINEA.

**c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2c).**

**(1) MINDANAO, 15 November 1944.**

Beachheads in the COTABATO-MALARANG and SARANGANI BAY areas of MINDANAO are seized by overseas landing operations with massed carrier-based air support, employing the combined amphibious and naval forces available at that time. These operations are accompanied by airborne movement to activate inland fields seized in conjunction with guerrilla forces. Fighters are flown in to these fields and to airfields established on the coast, to relieve carrier-based forces and maintain air superiority over the island. Landing forces advance as rapidly as practicable to the support of airborne forces and establish control of the road net and airfields of the area SARANGANI-CAGAYAN, ILIGAN-MALARANG-COTABATO. Thereafter, DAVAO is reduced by combined overland and short-range landing operations, supported by the Fleet. Remaining hostile centers of resistance are then reduced in detail.

Amphibious lift is employed in the initial movement of ground echelons of air units with their operating supplies.

Logistic and naval bases are promptly developed at DAVAO while air forces are established in the COTABATO-MALARANG and the VALENCIA-DEL MONTE areas. Preparations are expedited for the advance upon LUZON.

The SULU ARCHIPELAGO is occupied by minor consolidation operations and air forces are established for operations against hostile installations in Northern BORNEO.

**(2) RABAUL-NEW IRISHMAN.**

When blockade has reduced resistance in RABAUL and NEW IRISHMAN to a point where it is more economical to occupy than to maintain containing forces, these areas are taken over by Australian forces and hostile remnants mopped up.

~~TOP SECRET~~

e. ~~DISPOSITION OF FORCES IN CURRENT OPERATIONS (see Annex 2).~~

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assigned</u>	<u>On Advance</u>	<u>On Guard</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
1 DIV ARV, 5 Div Inf 1 Div AB 1 Regt Hatch 1 Regt Cav 2 Regt Inf (Philippines), less 2 Divs 1 Div (Ass't), BARBARA	3 DIVS INF 2-1/2 Divs INF		16-1/2 Divs INF 1 Div AB 1 Div (Ass't) 1 Regt Hatch 1 Regt Cav 2 Regt Inf (Philippines), less 2 Divs

<sup>xx</sup> Including assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces.

Assigned elements - 5th Air Force  
 " " 13th Air Force  
 " " RAAF Command  
 " " 7th Fleet  
 Supporting " 7th Air Force (from PALAU)  
 U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements for  
 rear-area operations in the BARBER-NEW BRUNSWICK area.

<sup>xx</sup> Including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. Fleet, as directed by J.C.S., to ensure non-interference by hostile fleet elements and to provide major carrier-borne direct air support of the operations.	7th Fleet (reinforced)	6 Divs, overseas landing operations. 1 Div, short-range equipment.

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5d.

~~TOP SECRET~~

PHASE IV  
(as directed)

a. TASK.

Reoccupy LUZON and establish bases necessary for support of attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Reoccupation of LUZON requires amphibious operations along familiar lines to seize initially the Central Plain and MANILA areas. Extensive bases will be required for the support of the attack into FORMOSA and CHINA. Existing airfields and base facilities can be readily improved to permit initiation of VLR bombing of JAPAN.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2d).

(1) VISAYAS, January 1945.

Preliminary operations can probably be initiated from MINDANAO during January 1945 to seize advance airdromes in the VISAYAS and the SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT area of Southern LUZON for support of operations into the vital areas of that island. Troops and air and naval support for these preliminary movements are provided from MINDANAO Occupation Forces, augmented by 1 division from the HALMANERA area. Operations into the VISAYAS are visualized as airborne, with seaborne logistic support. An amphibious operation into the SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT area is mounted from BAVAO.

(2) LUZON, February 1945.

The scheme of maneuver depends upon the forces available and the disposition and strength of the enemy at that time. MANILA and the LUZON Plain are initial objectives, followed by the seizure of airdrome areas in the extreme northern portion of the island.

Bases are established as required for support of the attacks into FORMOSA and the Central CHINA coast. Naval and air operations from LUZON sever Japanese shipping routes in the South CHINA SEA.

(3) Strategic Bombing Operations.

Strategic bombing operations, which have been conducted from Northwest AUSTRALIA throughout preceding phases, are extended to Northern BORNEO and into the South CHINA SEA, from the SULU ARCHIPELAGO and fields activated by minor operations on PALAWAN. VLR operations against JAPAN and hostile installations in KOREA and North CHINA may be initiated after relatively easy improvement of Central and Northern LUZON air base facilities.

d. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED (see Annex 3).

In view of profound changes in the PACIFIC situation which are certain to occur prior to the event, it is considered impracticable at this time to make specific estimates of forces required. The following should be regarded only as a guide to planning:

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault<sup>x</sup></u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
MANILA-CEBUAPI,	1 Div Inf 2 Div Inf (available in May)	6-1/3 Divs	18-1/3 Divs Inf 1 Div AB 1 Rgt Pkht
SUPPLY,	3 Divs Inf 1 Div AB 1 Rgt Pkht 6 Divs Inf 1 Div AB 1 Rgt Pkht 2 Rgts Inf (Filipino), less 2 Bns		2 Rgts Inf (Filipino), less 2 Bns

<sup>x</sup>Including assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces.<sup>xx</sup>

Assigned elements	5th Air Force
" "	13th Air Force
" "	RAAF Command
" "	7th Fleet
Attached	7th Air Force (operating from MINDANAO)

<sup>xx</sup>Including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. Fleet, as directed by J.C.S., to ensure non-inter- ference by hostile fleet elements and provide major carrier-based air support.	7th Fleet (reinforced)	8-1/4 Divs plus PANAY follow-up.


• LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5e.



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No.



ANNEX 2-A  
ZERO V  
PHASE 1  
MAY - JULY  
1944

LIMITED

OBJECTIVE AREA  
AND  
ASSAULT ELEMENT

JUNE  
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS  
TARGET DATE  
AND  
MOVING AREA


REARMAMENT  
AND TRAINING

GARDENING




GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No.




ANNEX 2-  
PHASE II  
AUGUST-OCTOBER  
1944





GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No.





ANNEX 2-4

REGD V

PHASE IV

JAN-JUNE 1945




## MAJOR UNITS

## AMPHIBIOUS LIFT\*

AIR FORCES

**ESTIMATE OF  
PRINCIPAL  
COMBAT  
ELEMENTS  
REQUIRED**

MAJOR UNITS  
COMBAT DIVISIONS  
and  
SEPERATE REGIMENTS



\*EMPLOYMENT MAY PERTAIN TO ANY DIVISION COMMITTED IN MINDANAO

\*ARAFURA SEA OPERATION

ANNEX 4-A

**RENO IV**

EMPLOYMENT  
OF  
COMBAT ELEMENTS

MAJOR UNITS

LEGEND

- |                                      |               |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|
| Division                             | 1st CAV       |
| Rehabilitation and Training          | •             |
| GHQ Reserve                          | [Shaded area] |
| Active Garrison and Minor Operations | —             |
| Assembly Area and Approach           | —             |
| OPERATION IN WHICH UNIT IS COMMITTED | —             |
| Amphibious Assault                   | —             |
| Airborne Operation                   | —             |
| Intra - Theater Movement             | —             |
| Extra - Theater Movement             | —             |

UNIT	CURRENT DISPOSITION	GEELVINK	NORTHERN VOGELKOP	(CONTINGENT) ARAFURA	HALMAHERA	MINDANAO	VISAYAS	LUZON	DISPOSITION JUNE, 1945	LOCATION OF MAJOR UNITS
						PHASE I	PHASE II	PHASE III	PHASE IV	
43rd Inf Div	New Zealand	Vitiaz Area				X	Mindanao(3)		Luzon	
37th " "	Bougainville	Vitiaz Area				X	Mindanao(3)		Mindanao(3)	
25th " "	New Caledonia	Vitiaz Area				X	X(3)		Visayas(3)	
3rd N.Z. "	Treasury-Green Is	Withdrawn, N.Z.								
93rd Inf "	Guadalcanal to Bougainville	Bougainville				Hollandia		X	Luzon	
40th " "	Guadalcanal to New Britain	New Britain				Finschhafen		X	Luzon	
America " "	Bougainville							X	Luzon	
1st Mar Div	New Britain to Guadalcanal	Withdrawn, POA								
1st Cav "	Manus					X	Mindanao(3)		Mindanao(3)	
24th Inf "	X	Hollandia						X	Luzon	
41st " "	X	X	Wakde-Biak					X	Luzon	
31st " "	Oro		X			Vogelkop			Vogelkop	
6th " "	Milne	Hollandia				X	Halmahera		Halmahera	
32nd " "	Saidor-Aitape	Aitape-Biak	Aitape			X		X(3)	Visayas(3)	
33rd " "	Finschhafen					X	Halmahera	X	Legaspi	Luzon
38th " "	Enroute from U.S.	Finschhafen						X	Luzon	
11th AB "	U.S.	Nadzab				X		X	Luzon	
158th Inf CT	Arawe & Kiriwina	X	Biak						Geelvink	
112th Cav Rgt	Arawe	Finschhafen				X	Sulu		Sulu	
503rd Pfcnt "	Nadzab					X		X	Luzon	
1st Phil "	U.S.	Finschhafen	New Britain			X		X	Luzon	
2nd " "	U.S.	Finschhafen	New Britain			X		X	Luzon	
6th Aust Div	Atherton		X	Kai-Tanimbar				Australia	Australia	
7th " "	"		X	Kai-Tanimbar		X	Bismarcks		Bismarcks	
9th " "	"		X						Kai-Tanimbar	
3rd " "	"								Australia	
5th " "	Saidor & Madang	Madang	Hansa			Wewak			Hollandia	
11th " "	Madang		Hansa			Bismarcks			Bismarcks	
12th " "	Darwin								Darwin	
4th " "	Merauke		Withdrawn				Withdrawn			
2nd " "	Perth									

## NOTES:

(1) All contingent operations are assumed to be carried out.

(2) "X" indicates employment in assault phase of operation.

(3) Assumed designation --- may be any division committed in MINDANAO.

RECAPITULATION, June 1945

## U. S. Divs:

Luzon.....	9
Visayas.....	2
Mindanao.....	2
Halmahera.....	1
Vogelkop.....	1
	15

## U. S. &amp; Phil. Rgts:

Luzon.....	3
Mindanao.....	1
Geelvink.....	1
	5

## Aust Divs:

Australia....	4
Bismarcks....	2
New Guinea....	1
Arafura.....	1
	8

TOP SECRET


SCALANNEX  $\frac{1}{4}$  PREC-LINES

## DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS

## PHASE I

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No.



ANNEX 4-C-2

RENO V

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS

PHASE IIIa

BIAK

- 3 Heavy Bomb Groups
- 2 Medium Groups
- 2 Light LB Groups
- 5 Fighter Groups
- 1 Photo Group
- 1 Recco Group
- 1 T.C. Group
- 1 PB4Y Squadron
- 1 Night. Fighter Squadron

MANUS

- 2 Heavy Bomb Groups
- 1 LAB Squadron
- 2 Fighter Squadrons
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

SAIDOR  
YAP IS.

- 1 Fighter Group
- 1 Medium Bomb Group

WAKDE

- 1 Fighter Group  
Staging for 2 Heavy Groups
- 1 PB2Y Squadron

GLoucester  
D FRUK IS.

- 1 Fighter Squadron

SOUTH PACIFIC

Navy and Marine Air Units plus detachment from 13th A/F as requested.

DARWIN

- 1 Heavy Bomb Group  
plus RAAF
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons
- 1 Fighter Squadron



MAPIA

Radio Range Facilities  
and emergency crash  
landing strip.

AYU

- 2 Fighter Groups
- 1 Light Bomb Group  
plus staging for  
two heavy Groups  
or the equivalent  
if available.

AITAPE

- Medium Bomb Group
- Light Bomb Group

HOLLANDIA

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

NEW GUINEA

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

BUKU

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

NEW BRITAIN

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

BOUGAINVILLE IS.

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

GUADALCANAL

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

SANTA ISABEL IS.

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

CHILOEUL IS.

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

NEW GEORGIA

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

WOODLARK IS.

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

FERGUSON IS.

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

D'ENTRECasteaux IS.

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

PORT MORESBY


- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

CAPE YORK

- 1 Fighter Squadron
- 2 T.C. Groups
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No.



SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES

ANNEX 4-c-3

RENO V

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS

PHASE IIb



## DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS

### PHASE III

160°

MINDANAO

5th A/Y

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No.

100 50 0 100 200 300  
LAT. 0° 10° 15°

SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES



ANNEX 5-a

## RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES  
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT  
INITIAL MAIN  
SUPPLY BASES

### LEGEND

- (◎) Army Main Supply Base.
- (○) Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- (□) Army Advance Supply Base.
- (+) Army Task Force Supply Point.
- (◎) Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- (●) Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- (●) Naval Lion.
- (■) Naval Cub.
- (⚓) Minor Naval Facilities.
- (○—○) Air Depot.
- (A) Supply Base, Australian Army Only.

TOP SECRET



ANNEX 5-b

RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES  
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT


PHASE I

LEGEND

- (●) Army Main Supply Base.
- (○) Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- (□) Army Advance Supply Base.
- (+) Army Task Force Supply Point.
- (◎) Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- (●) Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- (●) Naval Lion.
- (●) Naval Cub.
- (†) Minor Naval Facilities.

∞ Air Depot.  
--- Proposed.

TOP SECRET



## ANNEX 5-c

## RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES  
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PHASE II

## LEGEND

- (●) Army Main Supply Base.
- (○) Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- (□) Army Advance Supply Base.
- (+) Army Task Force Supply Point.
- (◎) Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- (●) Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- (●) Naval Lion.
- (●) Naval Cub.
- (●) Minor Naval Facilities.
- (○) Air Depot.
- Proposed.

TOP SECRET



## ANNEX 5-d

## RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES  
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PHASE III

## LEGEND

- (●) Army Main Supply Base.
- (○) Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- (□) Army Advance Supply Base.
- (+) Army Task Force Supply Point.
- (◎) Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- (●) Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- (⚓) Naval Lion.
- (●) Naval Cub.
- (†) Minor Naval Facilities.
- (∞) Air Depot.
- Proposed.

TOP SECRET



**ANNEX 5-e**

## LOCATION OF BASES FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

## **PHASE IV**

## LEGEND

- Army Main Supply Base.
  - Army Intermediate Supply Base.
  - Army Advance Supply Base.
  - + Army Task Force Supply Point.
  - ◎ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
  - Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
  - Naval Lion.
  - Naval Cub.
  - ↑ Minor Naval Facilities.
  - Air Depot.
  - Proposed.